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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Mark Renfro and Gerald Lustig, 
representatives of a putative class of participants in a 401(k) 
defined contribution plan, sued defendants Unisys Corp. and 
Fidelity Management Trust Co. and its related corporate 
entities under the Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  Plaintiffs alleged defendants inadequately 
selected a mix and range of  investment options to include in 
the plan.  The District Court dismissed the Fidelity entities, 
holding they were not fiduciaries with reference to the 
challenged conduct, dismissed the action holding plaintiffs‟ 
claims were implausible because the plan‟s mix and range of 
options was reasonable, and, in the alternative, granted 
Unisys‟s summary judgment motion holding the ERISA safe-
6 
harbor provisions exempted it from liability.  We will affirm 
the dismissal of the Fidelity entities and the dismissal of the 
action.  We will not reach the grant of summary judgment. 
 
I. 
A. 
 The Unisys Corporation Savings Plan is a “defined 
contribution plan” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(34), which is tax qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 401(k).  
“[A] „defined contribution plan‟ . . . promises the participant 
the value of an individual account at retirement, which is 
largely a function of the amounts contributed to that account 
and the investment performance of those contributions.”  
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250 n.1 
(2008).  These plans “dominate the retirement plan scene 
today.”  Id. at 255. 
 The Unisys plan consists of several investment options 
(seventy-three as of the filing of the complaint) into which 
non-union Unisys employees may allocate contributions.  An 
employee-participant may contribute up to 30%, but no more 
than $15,000 per year, of his or her pre-tax wages into the 
plan.  Unisys then matches half of the participant‟s 
contribution, capped at 2% of the participant‟s wages, which 
it invests in the Unisys Stock Fund.  Participants are fully 
vested in their accounts.   
 Of the seventy-three options included in the plan, 
participants could invest in either of a stable value fund or the 
Unisys Stock Fund, or one of seventy-one options provided 
under trust agreement with Fidelity.  Of the seventy-one 
options provided by Fidelity, four were commingled pools.  
7 
Commingled pools consist of funds commingled from 
different sources owning shares in the pool.  They are part of 
a group trust owned by a bank.  Of the commingled pools 
included in the Unisys plan, one commingled pool invested in 
an S&P 500 index, and three commingled pools invested in 
bonds. 
 The remaining sixty-seven investment options were 
mutual funds.  “„A mutual fund is a pool of assets, consisting 
primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, and belonging to the 
individual investors holding shares in the fund.‟”  Jones v. 
Harris Assocs. L.P., --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 
(2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 
U.S. 471, 480 (1979)).  Mutual funds are organized as 
investment companies, which are governed by the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.  See Jones, 
130 S. Ct. at 1422.   Accordingly, they are subject to a variety 
of reporting, governance, and transparency requirements that 
do not apply to other investment vehicles such as commingled 
pools. 
 The Unisys plan‟s mutual funds were added in 1993 by 
way of a trust agreement with Fidelity.  Fidelity, as a directed 
trustee of the plan, agreed to provide administrative services 
bundled with the investment options.  In return, Unisys 
agreed that any additions to the funds to be managed by 
Fidelity would be Fidelity funds.  The agreement did not 
prohibit Unisys from adding non-Fidelity options to its plan, 
and administering them itself, or from contracting with 
another company to administer non-Fidelity investments.  In 
fact, in its recitals, the trust agreement stated certain 
investments were to be held in trust and administered by 
CoreStates, a trustee unaffiliated with Fidelity. 
8 
 Each mutual fund included in the plan incurred fees for 
investment management.  These fees are set for each mutual 
fund in an expense ratio—a percentage of each contributor‟s 
assets invested in a particular fund.   The plan had a wide 
variety of risk and expense ratios; the expense ratios on the 
funds included in the Unisys plan ranged from 0.1%  to 
1.21%.  Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41563, at *7 n.2 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2010) (taking 
judicial notice of the fees because they were disclosed in 
prospectuses filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission).  These fees pay for, among other things, 
management of the investments and compliance with 
securities laws.  All fees were disclosed in materials 
distributed to the participants.
1
  Regardless of these fees, the 
Unisys plan participants appear to strongly prefer mutual fund 
investments.  As of the filing of the complaint, nearly $1.9 
billion of the plan‟s roughly $2 billion worth of assets were 
invested in these mutual funds. 
B. 
 Plaintiffs sued Unisys and the Fidelity entities in the 
United States District Court in the Central District of 
California alleging breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1104 and 1132(a)(2), and for equitable relief under § 
1132(a)(3) relating to defendants‟ selection for inclusion and 
maintenance of investment options in the Unisys plan.  The 
case was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
                                              
1
Plaintiffs do not contest that the plan documents distributed 
to participants contained accurate information about all the 
investment options.  Nor do plaintiffs dispute that Unisys 
provided information services to furnish participants with 
additional information about investment options upon request. 
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 While the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued 
its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007), and Aschroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009), addressing pleading standards.  Plaintiffs sought and 
were granted leave to file an amended complaint and a second 
amended complaint, which was filed on September 3, 2009.
2
   
 In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that Unisys and the 
Fidelity entities breached their duties of loyalty and prudence 
by selecting and retaining retail mutual funds in the range of 
investment options.  Specifically, plaintiffs contend the 
administrative fees governed by the trust agreement, and the 
fees associated with each retail mutual fund, are excessive in 
light of the services rendered as compared to other, less 
expensive, investment options not included in the plan.  These 
allegations focus on the inclusion of so-called retail mutual 
funds, which are available to individual investors with small 
investments as well as to large ERISA funds such as 
Unisys‟s.  Plaintiffs allege Unisys could have selected 
investments having lower fees than mutual funds and/or used 
the size of its plan as leverage to bargain for lower fee rates 
on mutual funds. 
 Both the Fidelity entities and Unisys moved to dismiss 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  See Renfro, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41563, at *3.  The Fidelity entities contended they 
were not fiduciaries with respect to the challenged conduct 
and, relying on the Seventh Circuit‟s decision in Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009), supplemented by 
569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009), that plaintiffs had failed to 
plead a plausible breach of fiduciary duty.  In addition, the 
                                              
2
For ease of reference, we refer to the Second Amended 
Complaint simply as “the complaint.” 
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Fidelity entities argued plaintiffs‟ claims were barred by 
ERISA‟s six-year limitation period.  29 U.S.C. § 1113.  
Unisys similarly argued plaintiffs did not adequately plead a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  In the alternative, Unisys moved for 
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), contending 
ERISA‟s safe harbor provision, 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(c)(1)(A)(ii), shielded it from liability because the 
alleged losses were the aggregate result of the participants‟ 
own investment decisions. 
 The District Court denied the statute of limitations 
motion on the ground that ERISA fiduciary breaches are 
continuing violations that accrue each time a plan incurs a 
loss as a result of a breach.  But the court granted the Fidelity 
entities‟ motion to dismiss, concluding as a matter of law 
under the trust agreement that Fidelity and its related 
corporate entities were not fiduciaries with respect to the 
challenged conduct because they did not exercise control over 
the inclusion of investment options in the plan.  Renfro, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41563, at *15-19.  The court also granted 
the defendants‟ motion to dismiss on the grounds the 
complaint failed to state a claim because the plan “„offered a 
sufficient mix of investments for their participants‟ [such] 
that no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the 
facts alleged in the operative complaint, that the Unisys 
defendants breached an ERISA fiduciary duty by offering this 
particular array of investment vehicles.”  Id. at *19 (quoting 
Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586.).   In the alternative, the court 
granted Unisys‟s motion for summary judgment, finding 
ERISA section 404(c) shielded Unisys from liability for any 
alleged breach because the participants chose the investment 
options into which they allocated their contributions.  Id. at 
*31. 
11 
 Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
II.
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A. 
 Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is 
plenary.  Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of complaints for “failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6).  The question is “not whether [plaintiffs] will 
ultimately prevail . . . but whether [their] complaint was 
sufficient to cross the federal court‟s threshold.”  Skinner v. 
Switzer, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).  “Because Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) „requires a “showing”, rather than a 
blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief,‟ courts evaluating 
the viability of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) must look 
beyond conclusory statements and determine whether the 
complaint‟s well-pled factual allegations, taken as true, are 
„enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.‟”  
In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 319 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3).  But 
plaintiffs “need only allege „enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1322 n.12 (2011) 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  Accordingly, we must 
examine the context of a claim, including the underlying 
substantive law, in order to assess its plausibility.  See Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 320 n.18. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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B. 
1. 
 ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute, the 
product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation‟s 
private employee benefit system.”  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (internal quotation omitted).  In 
enacting ERISA, Congress “resolved innumerable disputes 
between powerful competing interests—not all in favor of 
potential plaintiffs.”  Id. at 262.  Because “Congress did not 
require employers to establish benefit plans in the first place . 
. . ERISA represents a careful balancing between ensuring 
fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.”  Conkright v. 
Frommert, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648-49 (2010) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  Accordingly, 
Congress sought to “induc[e] employers to offer benefits by 
assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform 
standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of 
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has 
occurred.”  Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 
355, 379 (2002).  To that end, ERISA authorizes six distinct 
civil actions that may be brought by various parties under 
delineated circumstances, including actions by plan 
participants to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty.  See LaRue, 
552 U.S. at 253. 
2. 
 ERISA requires each plan to have one or more named 
fiduciaries that are granted the authority to manage the 
operation and administration of the plan.  29 U.S.C. § 
1102(a)(1).  But by ERISA‟s definition: 
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a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to 
the extent 
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of 
such plan or exercises any authority or control 
respecting management or disposition of its 
assets,  
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with 
respect to any moneys or other property of such 
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do 
so, or  
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.  Such term includes 
any person designated under section 1105 
(c)(1)(B) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  Because an entity is only a 
fiduciary to the extent it possesses authority or discretionary 
control over the plan, see id.; In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. 
Benefits ERISA Litig. (Unisys III), 579 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 
2009), we “must ask whether [the entity] is a fiduciary with 
respect to the particular activity in question,” Srein v. 
Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation omitted).  “In every case charging breach 
of ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the threshold question is not 
whether the actions of some person employed to provide 
services under a plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary‟s 
interest, but whether that person was acting as a fiduciary 
(that is, was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the 
action subject to complaint.”  Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 
211, 226 (2000). 
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3. 
 ERISA imposes statutory duties on fiduciaries that 
“„relate to the proper management, administration, and 
investment of fund assets,‟ with an eye toward ensuring that 
„the benefits authorized by the plan‟ are ultimately paid to 
participants and beneficiaries.”  LaRue, 552 U.S. at 253 
(quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 
142 (1985)).  Accordingly, an ERISA fiduciary is required to: 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and—  
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:  
(i) providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries; and  
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan;  
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 The fiduciary standard “is flexible, such that the 
adequacy of a fiduciary‟s independent investigation and 
ultimate investment selection is evaluated in light of the 
character and aims of the particular type of plan he serves.”  
In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig. (Unisys I), 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).  And an ERISA 
fiduciary acts prudently when it gives “appropriate 
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consideration to those facts and circumstances that, given the 
scope of such fiduciary‟s investment duties, the fiduciary 
knows or should know are relevant to the . . . investment 
course of action involved . . . .”  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-
1(b)(1)(i).  Accordingly, in evaluating a questioned decision, 
we have focused on a fiduciary‟s “conduct in arriving at [that] 
investment decision.”  Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 434.  But we have 
also approved of an approach examining whether a 
questioned decision led to objectively prudent investments.  
See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig. (Unisys II), 173 F.3d 145, 
153-54 (3d Cir. 1999) (approving of the “hypothetical prudent 
investor” test); see also Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 
16 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Even if a trustee failed to 
conduct an investigation before making a decision, he is 
insulated from liability if a hypothetical prudent fiduciary 
would have made the same decision anyway.”); Fink v. Nat’l 
Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending a 
fiduciary should not be liable for damages when, regardless 
of its failure to investigate beforehand, it made or held 
objectively prudent investments).  
III. 
 We first turn to the dismissal of the Fidelity 
defendants.  Fidelity concedes it was a fiduciary under the 
plan because it was a directed trustee with respect to certain 
assets and administrative functions.  But the parties contest 
whether Fidelity and its related corporate entities were 
fiduciaries with respect to the challenged conduct of selecting 
and retaining investment options in the Unisys plan.  
Plaintiffs proceed under three theories to assert that Fidelity 
and its related corporate entities were fiduciaries with 
reference to the challenged conduct, or otherwise could be 
16 
liable for restitution. 
A. 
 Plaintiffs contend that Fidelity, by virtue of its role as a 
directed trustee, functioned as a fiduciary with reference to 
the claimed breach.  As noted, ERISA requires every plan to 
have one or more named fiduciaries.  29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).  
ERISA also requires plan assets to be held in trust.  Id. § 
1103(a).  A directed trustee, such as Fidelity, is a fiduciary 
“subject to proper directions” of one of the plan‟s named 
fiduciaries.  See id. § 1103(a)(1).   
 The trust agreement appointing Fidelity as a directed 
trustee limited Fidelity‟s role to “hold and invest . . . plan 
assets in trust among several investment options selected by 
the Applicable Fiduciary,” and to “perform recordkeeping 
and administrative services for the Plan if the services are 
purely ministerial in nature and are provided within a 
framework of plan provisions, guidelines and interpretations 
conveyed in writing to [Fidelity] by the Administrator.”4   
The agreement expressly disclaimed any role for Fidelity in 
selecting investment options, stating,  “[Fidelity entities] shall 
have no responsibility for the selection of investment options 
under the Trust,”  Instead, the agreement required that 
Fidelity be explicitly “direct[ed] . . . as to what investment 
options . . . Plan participants may invest in.”  Fidelity‟s 
limited role as a directed trustee, delineated in the trust 
agreement, does not encompass the activities alleged as a 
breach of fiduciary duty—the selection and maintenance of 
the mix and range of investment options included in the plan.  
                                              
4
 We review interpretations of a trust agreement de novo.  
Ulmer v. Harsco Corp., 884 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1989).  
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As we have explained, a directed trustee is essentially 
“immune from judicial inquiry” because it lacks discretion, 
taking instructions from the plan that it is required to follow.  
See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 Contrary to plaintiffs‟ assertion, the agreement‟s 
unambiguous amendment provisions do not undermine this 
allocation of authority.  Section 5(b) of the trust agreement 
allows for amendment of the investment options included in 
the trust agreement by mutual agreement of the parties.  
Fidelity entities were required to give their consent in order 
for funds to be added to the group of plan investments it 
administers.  This provision extends Fidelity‟s control only 
over which investments were to be administered by Fidelity 
and not over which investments were selected for inclusion in 
the plan as a whole.  Unisys remained free to add non-Fidelity 
investments to the Unisys plan and to administer such 
investments itself or contract that function to another party.  
In fact, the trust agreement‟s recitals state Unisys intended to 
add other investments to a trust to be managed by CoreStates.  
Fidelity had no contractual authority to control the mix and 
range of investment options, to veto Unisys‟s selections, or to 
constrain Unisys from including other investment options in 
the plan administered by an entity other than Fidelity.  It 
therefore did not a function as a fiduciary with respect to 
selecting and maintaining the range of investment options in 
the plan.  Accordingly, Fidelity‟s status as a directed trustee 
does not subject it to liability for these activities. 
B. 
 Plaintiffs also contend Fidelity is liable for any breach 
by Unisys as a co-fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).  This 
section provides: 
18 
In addition to any liability which he may have 
under any other provisions of this part, a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable 
for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of 
another fiduciary with respect to the same plan 
in the following circumstances:  
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or 
knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or 
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such 
act or omission is a breach;  
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 
1104 (a)(1) of this title in the administration of 
his specific responsibilities which give rise to 
his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such 
other fiduciary to commit a breach; or  
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such 
other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable 
efforts under the circumstances to remedy the 
breach. 
 
 As noted, Fidelity is a directed trustee of the plan 
owing fiduciary duties with respect to the limited authority 
and discretion it exercises.  At the outset, we note a party 
“does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the 
service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary‟s 
negotiation and approval of those terms.”   Hecker, 556 F.3d 
at 583; see also Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare 
Fund v. Caremark, Inc., 474 F.3d 463, 473 (7th Cir. 2007).  
“When a person who has no relationship to an ERISA plan is 
negotiating a contract with that plan, he has no authority over 
or responsibility to the plan and presumably is unable to 
exercise any control over the trustees‟ decision whether or 
not, and on what terms, to enter into an agreement with him. 
19 
Such a person is not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the 
terms of the agreement for his compensation.”  F.H. Krear & 
Co. v. Nineteen Named Trs., 810 F.2d 1250, 1259 (2d Cir. 
1987).  Plaintiffs allege Unisys selected investment options 
with excessive fees caused by a fee structure negotiated 
between Unisys and Fidelity for included mutual funds.  
Fidelity owes no fiduciary duty with respect to the negotiation 
of its fee compensation by Unisys.  Moreover, Fidelity was 
not yet a plan fiduciary at the time it negotiated the fee 
compensation with Unisys.   
 Even assuming Fidelity‟s subsequent assumption of 
the role of directed trustee could subject it to co-fiduciary 
liability for a breach by Unisys relating to the mix and range 
of investment options in the plan, including risk and fee 
profiles,  sections 1105(a)(1) and (3) require actual 
knowledge of the breach.
5
  “„Under this rule, the fiduciary 
must know the other person is a fiduciary with respect to the 
plan, must know that he participated in the act that constituted 
a breach, and must know that it was a breach.‟”  Donovan v. 
Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1475 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 1280).  Plaintiffs‟ claims fail because they do 
                                              
5
 Section 1105(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for plaintiffs.  
Under that section, as a predicate to liability, plaintiffs must 
first plausibly allege Fidelity breached fiduciary duties it 
owed in its role as a directed trustee.  Plaintiffs have not 
alleged any breach by Fidelity of its fiduciary duties 
regarding its disposition of assets or administration of the 
plan as a directed trustee.  The complaint is directed 
exclusively at the selection and maintenance of investment 
options, which, as discussed above, fall outside of the scope 
of Fidelity‟s fiduciary duty. 
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not contend Fidelity had knowledge about Unisys‟s allegedly 
flawed decision-making process regarding investment options 
to be included in the plan.  In fact, by contending that Fidelity 
failed adequately to review the plan‟s fees in light of the size 
of the plan‟s assets, plaintiffs effectively concede Fidelity did 
not possess actual knowledge of Unisys‟s alleged breach.  See 
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75(B), 80B-C.  Similarly, plaintiffs do 
not allege Fidelity knew Unisys‟s selection of investment 
options constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.  Accordingly, 
plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Fidelity under § 1105(a). 
C. 
 Finally, plaintiffs contend the Fidelity entities are 
liable for restitution under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which 
provides a civil action may be brought: 
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary  
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates 
any provision of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan, or  
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief  
(i) to redress such violations or  
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan. 
 
 We have held this provision authorizes direct suits 
against fiduciaries for breach of their duty.  See Bixler v. 
Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 
1293-94 (3d Cir. 1993).  But two years after Bixler, in Reich 
v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1995), we examined 
whether the Secretary of Labor could bring suit under 29 
U.S.C. §1132(a)(5) against nonfiduciaries alleged to have 
participated in a breach of fiduciary duty.  We noted the 
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Supreme Court‟s dictum in Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260, 
expressed “considerable doubt that [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)] 
authorizes suits against nonfiduciaries who participate in 
fiduciary breaches.”  Reich, 57 F.3d at 282.  Finding this 
dictum persuasive and noting that “the language shared by 
[sections 1132(a)(3) and 1132(a)(5)] „should be deemed to 
have the same meaning,‟” id. at 284 (quoting Mertens, 508 
U.S. at 260), we held that the Secretary of Labor could not 
bring suit under § 1132(a)(5) against “nonfiduciaries charged 
solely with participating in a fiduciary breach,”6 id. 
 In light of Reich, and interpreting identical language, 
we find Mertens persuasive and hold that 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3) does not authorize suit against “nonfiduciaries 
charged solely with participating in a fiduciary breach.”  
Reich, 57 F.3d at 284.  Because, as previously discussed, the 
Fidelity entities did not act as fiduciaries with respect to the 
alleged breach, they may not be sued under this section for 
acts taken in a nonfiduciary role. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
dismissal of the complaint against the Fidelity defendants. 
IV. 
 As for the claims against Unisys, it appears to concede 
                                              
6
 In Reich, we found that the same section authorized suits for 
nonfiduciary participation by parties in interest to transactions 
prohibited under ERISA.  57 F.3d at 287; accord Harris Trust 
& Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 
241 (2000).  In this case, plaintiffs do not appear to contend 
the Fidelity entities were parties in interest to a prohibited 
transaction. 
22 
it is a fiduciary with respect to the selection and maintenance 
of the plan‟s mix and range of investment options.  But the 
parties contest whether, given the composition of the mix and 
range, plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded a breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
A. 
1. 
 In this case, the putative class frames its complaint as a 
challenge against the selection and periodic evaluation of the 
Unisys defined contribution plan‟s mix and range of 
investment options.  Plaintiffs do not challenge the prudence 
of the inclusion of any particular investment option.   
Specifically, plaintiffs take issue with the inclusion of an 
array of Fidelity retail mutual funds—funds that are available 
on the same terms to individual investors in the open market.   
Plaintiffs also allege the fees on the mutual fund options are 
excessive in comparison to the services rendered, both as 
compared to other mutual funds and to other types of 
investments Unisys could have selected for inclusion in the 
plan.  Within this rubric, plaintiffs point to the structure of 
Fidelity‟s fee compensation on the mutual funds, which is in 
part calculated as a percentage of the total assets in the funds.  
Plaintiffs contend the services required to administer mutual 
funds do not vary based on the aggregate amount of assets in 
the funds.  Rather, they contend fees should be calculated on 
a per-participant basis.  In addition, because the plan includes 
only a few other investment vehicles such as commingled 
funds and company stock, plaintiffs argue this plausibly 
demonstrates Unisys breached its fiduciary duties in 
composing the mix and range of investment options included 
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in the plan.
7
  In sum, plaintiffs challenge the 401(k) plan as a 
whole, alleging Unisys inadequately investigated and selected 
investment options into which plan participants could choose 
to allocate their contributions. 
2. 
 Two sister circuits have evaluated similar complaints 
at the motion to dismiss stage.  See Hecker, 556 F.3d 575; 
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 
2009).  Hecker and Braden share a similar analytical 
framework for evaluating an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty 
claim targeting the selection and maintenance of a mix and 
range of investment options in a 401(k) defined contribution 
plan.  Both courts looked first to the characteristics of the mix 
and range of options and then evaluated the plausibility of 
claims challenging fund selection against the backdrop of the 
reasonableness of the mix and range of investment options.  
See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586 (“In our view, the undisputed 
facts leave no room for doubt that the Deere Plans offered a 
sufficient mix of investments for their participants.  Thus, . . . 
no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the facts 
alleged in th[e] Complaint, that Deere failed to satisfy [the 
duty to furnish an acceptable array of investment vehicles].”); 
Braden, 588 F.3d at 596 (“[T]he complaint‟s allegations can 
                                              
7
 In addition, plaintiffs allege for the first time on appeal that 
Fidelity impermissibly distributed fee revenues among its 
corporate affiliates.  As discussed, plaintiffs did challenge the 
mutual fund fee structure in the complaint, see Second Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 42-43, but they did not challenge Fidelity‟s 
internal distribution of fees.  Accordingly, this issue is 
waived. See Srein, 323 F.3d at 224 n.8; Gordon v. Wawa, 
Inc., 388 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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be understood to assert that the Plan includes a relatively 
limited menu of funds which were selected by Wal-Mart 
executives despite the ready availability of better options.  
The complaint alleges, moreover, that these options were 
chosen to benefit the trustee at the expense of the 
participants.”).  
 In Hecker, the Seventh Circuit examined a plan 
containing twenty-three Fidelity mutual funds, two 
investment funds also managed by Fidelity, a fund of Deere 
stock,  as well as access to a brokerage window granting 
access to 2500 other funds managed by a variety of 
companies.  See 556 F.3d at 578.  Plaintiffs alleged the fees 
were excessive because most of the plan‟s options were retail 
mutual funds.  Id. at 579.  The fee ratios ranged from .07% to 
just over 1%.  Id. at 586.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court‟s dismissal of the claim, reasoning the mix and 
range of options was sufficient to fulfill any fiduciary duty 
Deere had to “furnish an acceptable array of investment 
vehicles.”  See id.   The court found it implausible that the 
decision-making process was undertaken imprudently and 
held that plaintiffs failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. 
 Conversely, in Braden, the Eighth Circuit examined a 
plan containing ten retail mutual funds, a collective trust, 
Wal-Mart stock, and a stable value fund.  See 588 F.3d at 
589.  Plaintiffs alleged breaches of fiduciary duties 
surrounding the fees on the funds, including allegations of a 
hidden kickback scheme between Merrill Lynch, a fiduciary, 
and the included funds.  See id. at 590.  Taking the same 
approach as Hecker, but arriving at a different conclusion, the 
Braden court evaluated the complaint‟s allegations, including 
the kickback scheme, in light of a plan that had far fewer 
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available investment options than the plan in Hecker.  See id. 
at 596 n.6 (“The far narrower range of investment options 
available in this case makes more plausible the claim that this 
Plan was imprudently managed.”). 
 We agree with our sister circuits‟ approach to 
evaluating these claims.  An ERISA defined contribution plan 
is designed to offer participants meaningful choices about 
how to invest their retirement savings.   Accordingly, we hold 
the range of investment options and the characteristics of 
those included options—including the risk profiles, 
investment strategies, and associated fees—are highly 
relevant and readily ascertainable facts against which the 
plausibility of claims challenging the overall composition of a 
plan‟s mix and range of investment options should be 
measured. 
3. 
 Looking—as plaintiffs urge—at the Unisys plan as a 
whole in the context of plaintiffs‟ allegations, we are unable 
“to infer from what is alleged that the process was flawed.”  
Braden, 588 F.3d at 596.  The Unisys plan contains a variety 
of investment options including company stock, commingled 
funds, and mutual funds.  As of the filing of the second 
amended complaint, the plan contained seventy-three distinct 
investment options.  Among the retail mutual funds 
specifically targeted in the complaint were funds with a 
variety of risk and fee profiles, including low-risk and low-
fee options.  This range of selections is much closer to the 
characteristics of the plan evaluated by the Hecker court than 
to the scanty mix and range of selections in the plan reviewed 
by the Braden court. 
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 In light of the reasonable mix and range of investment 
options in the Unisys plan, plaintiffs‟ factual allegations about 
Unisys‟s conduct do not plausibly support their claims.  
Unlike the pleadings in Braden, plaintiffs have not contended 
there was any sort of concealed kickback scheme relating to 
fee payments made to the directed trustee as the quid pro quo 
for inclusion of particular unaffiliated mutual funds.  Their 
allegations concerning fees are directed exclusively to the fee 
structure and are limited to contentions that Unisys should 
have paid per-participant fees rather than fees based on a 
percentage of assets in the plan. 
 Evaluating plaintiffs‟ complaint in light of an ERISA 
defined contribution 401(k) plan having a reasonable range of 
investment options with a variety of risk profiles and fee 
rates, we believe plaintiffs have provided nothing more than 
conclusory assertions that Unisys breached its duty to 
prudently and loyally select and maintain the plan‟s mix and 
range of investment options.  Accordingly, evaluating the 
plan as a whole in light of plaintiffs‟ general allegations of 
imprudence and disloyalty in the selection and inclusion of 
funds, we do not believe plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a 
breach of fiduciary duty.   We will affirm the District Court‟s 
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
V. 
 The District Court also granted Unisys‟s summary 
judgment motion, holding in the alternative that even if 
Unisys breached its fiduciary duties in its selection and 
maintenance of the range and mix of investment options in its 
ERISA 401(k) plan, Unisys was shielded from liability by 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(c), ERISA‟s safe harbor provision.  The 
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provision reads in part: 
 (A) In the case of a pension plan which 
provides for individual accounts and permits a 
participant or beneficiary to exercise control 
over the assets in his account, if a participant or 
beneficiary exercises control over the assets in 
his account (as determined under regulations of 
the Secretary)—  
. . . . 
(ii) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall 
be liable under this part for any loss, or by 
reason of any breach, which results from such 
participant‟s or beneficiary‟s exercise of control 
. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A). 
 In Unisys I, we held “[t]here is nothing in Section 
1104(c)[‟s plain language] which suggests that a breach on 
the part of a fiduciary bars it from asserting section 1104(c)‟s 
application. . . . [T]he statute‟s unqualified instruction that a 
fiduciary is excused from liability for „any loss‟ which 
„results from [a] participant‟s or [a] beneficiary‟s exercise of 
control‟ clearly indicates that a fiduciary may call upon 
section 1104(c)‟s protection where a causal nexus between a 
participant‟s or a beneficiary‟s exercise of control and the 
claimed loss is demonstrated.”8  74 F.3d at 445 (footnote 
                                              
8
 We found the term “control” in § 1104(c)(1)(A) to be 
ambiguous as to “whether [a plan] fall[s] within the statute‟s 
coverage.”  Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 446.   We acknowledged that 
the Department of Labor was charged by Congress to issue 
regulations about which plans would qualify for the defense,  
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omitted).  We went on to explain that “[t]his requisite causal 
connection is, in our view, established with proof that a 
participant‟s or a beneficiary‟s control was a cause-in-fact, as 
well as a substantial contributing factor in bringing about the 
loss incurred.”  Id.    
 Plaintiffs, supported by the Secretary of Labor as 
amicus curiae, maintain we must give Chevron deference to 
the Secretary‟s current position that “section 404(c) does not 
give fiduciaries a defense to liability for their own 
imprudence in the selection or monitoring of investment 
options available under the plan.”   Br. of the Sec‟y of Labor 
in Supp. of Pls. at 22.   Conversely, defendants maintain 
Unisys I‟s holding that the statute unambiguously exempts a 
fiduciary from liability for any loss caused by a participant‟s 
exercise of control forecloses plaintiffs‟ arguments.  Because 
the District Court properly dismissed the complaint, we 
refrain from deciding whether Unisys was entitled to 
summary judgment on this defense.  
                                                                                                     
id. at 444 n.21, but we explained that because the regulations 
were not in effect when the challenged transactions occurred, 
they did not guide our analysis, id.  Accordingly, we 
examined the legislative history of the statute and the 
common law of trusts to ascertain whether the plans at issue 
were eligible for safe harbor protection.  Id. at 444-46.  
Consequently, because we found this to be a fact-bound issue 
on which Unisys had not met its burden, we denied summary 
judgment and  remanded for consideration in light of our 
analysis.  Id. at 446-47. 
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VI. 
 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
